Delayed collection of unemployment insurance in recessions
Abstract
"Using variations in UI policies over time and across U.S. states, this paper provides evidence that allowing unemployed workers to delay the collection of benefits increases their job-finding rate. In a model with discrete job take-up decisions, benefit entitlement, wage-indexed benefits, and heterogeneous job types, I demonstrate that the policy can increase an unemployed worker's willingness to work, even though more benefits in general reduce the relative value of employment. In a calibrated quantitative model, I find that allowing delayed benefit collection increases the overall job finding rates and may lower unemployment rate both in a steady state stationary economy and over a transition path during 2008 - 2012." (Author's abstract, © 2019 Elsevier) ((en))
Weitere Informationen
Autorin / Autor
Bibliografische Daten
Xie, Zoe (2019): Delayed collection of unemployment insurance in recessions. In: European Economic Review, Vol. 118, No. September, S. 274-295.
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